Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2022

Democracy and Disenchantment
Ashraf Ahmed
Columbia Law School, aahmed4@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Ashraf Ahmed, Democracy and Disenchantment, 75 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 223 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3583

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

RESPONSE
Democracy and Disenchantment
Ashraf Ahmed*
I.

II.

J UDICIAL CRAFT & PARTISAN ADVANTAGE .......................... 226
A.
Federalism ............................................................... 228
B.
Statutory Interpretation ........................................... 229
C.
Justiciability ............................................................ 230
D.
Remedies .................................................................. 231
BANISHING THE J UDICIARY? ................................................ 232

During the latter half of the Trump presidency, as it became
increasingly clear that the Supreme Court would remain solidly
conservative for the foreseeable future, Samuel Moyn and Ryan
Doerfler declared war. In popular and scholarly venues, they have
steadily built a case for curtailing the power of the nation’s highest
court. Their arguments have been both pragmatic and principled. They
have underlined, for instance, the risks the Roberts Court poses to
progressive goals such as addressing climate change1 and granting
student debt relief.2 More broadly, they object to a “supra-democratic
court exercising its current, expansive legislative veto.” 3 For Doerfler
and Moyn, the choice is between juristocracy and democracy and they
know where they stand: reforming the Supreme Court, and in

*
Academic Fellow and Lecturer in Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to the participants
in the Academic Fellows Workshop for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1.
Samuel Moyn & Aaron Belkin, The Roberts Court Would Likely Strike Down Climate
Change
Legislation,
TAKE
BACK
THE
COURT
(Sept.
2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/60383088576eb25a150fab7f/t/6049332cd733411f1654d27d/
1618527381533/Supreme%2BCourt%2BWill%2BOverturn%2BClimate%2BLegislation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6AS-PY4J].
2.
Ryan D. Doerfler, Executive Orders and Smart Lawyers Won’t Save Us, JACOBIN (Dec. 1,
2019),
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/executive-orders-supreme-court-law-college-debt
[https://perma.cc/3CKV-UEHE].
3.
Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Making the Supreme Court Safe for Democracy, NEW
REPUBLIC (Oct. 13, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/159710/supreme-court-reform-courtpacking-diminish-power [https://perma.cc/C7B2-YZ4Q].
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particular disempowering it, is necessary for the future of American
democracy.4
The Ghost of John Hart Ely is Doerfler and Moyn’s latest salvo
against American judicial review.5 This time, however, their strategy is
different. Instead of directly critiquing the Supreme Court’s power, they
target the ideology that undergirds it. In particular, they identify the
work of John Hart Ely as responsible for animating continued liberal
belief that a powerful Supreme Court is both necessary and desirable
for democracy. Ely famously justified judicial review on two grounds: it
was necessary for protecting political minorities against systemic bias
and ensuring a competitive political process by “clearing the channels
of political change.”6 While scholars have closely scrutinized Ely’s
proceduralism in the decades that followed Democracy and Distrust’s7
publication, Moyn and Doerfler contend that his real influence—indeed
his “ghost”—lives on through the “two empirical conjectures he makes
that mainstream liberals share.”8 Even if Ely’s theory has fallen out of
fashion, liberal confidence in the Court has endured because
contemporary thinkers continue to hold on to Ely’s assumptions.
Ely’s twin premises concern the “comparative institutional
advantage[s]” of courts in protecting minorities and policing the
political process.9 The first, on which judicial defense of minorities rests,
is that “government officials on their own are more attentive to the
interests of minorities than are ordinary citizens.”10 From this it follows
that “insulation from majoritarian pressures makes judges more
reliable than elected officials in attending to minoritarian interests.” 11
Ely’s second assumption underwrites his faith in judges ministering the
“law of democracy.”12 This assumption holds that judges are
“comparatively disinterested in electoral outcomes because of life
tenure and so can be relied upon to select electoral rules more fairly”
than elected officials who “have an obvious interest in choosing rules
that are to their advantage.”13
4.
Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CAL. L. REV.
1703 (2021).
5.
Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, The Ghost of John Hart Ely, 75 VAND. L. REV 769
(2022).
6.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74 (1980)
(explaining the Warren Court’s jurisprudence as concerned with both goals).
7.
Id.
8.
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 770–71.
9.
Id. at 772.
10. Id. at 773.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Since both claims are empirical, they can be falsified. The Ghost
of John Hart Ely is an extended exercise in showing why Ely’s
assumptions are “uncertain at best” and “dubious at worst.”14 Against
the first conjecture, Doerfler and Moyn advance historical and
institutional reasons why the Court is not comparatively better than
Congress in protecting minorities. From the Waite Court’s neutering of
the Civil Rights Act of 187515 to the Roberts’ Court’s steady
dismemberment of the Voting Rights Act16 to broader judicial
“apprehension” in recognizing and enforcing positive rights, 17 they
argue that the Court is more likely to be an opponent of vulnerable
minorities than their defender. In response to the second conjecture—
the alleged superiority of judges in administering the law of
democracy—Doerfler and Moyn make two moves. First, they note that
“as a conjecture about judicial behavior . . . Ely’s theory fails” since
judges have shown themselves to be nearly as ideological as their
counterparts in the political branches.18 Second, and more ambitiously,
they claim that “since what counts as a fair and undistorted electoral
process is itself a central ideological or political question, we should not
be surprised that judges have been unable to transcend factional
interests.”19 Both because of personnel (ideological judges) and
substance (the contours of democracy itself are political), Doerfler and
Moyn conclude that Ely’s second premise fails and judicial review in the
law of democracy is as fraught and flawed as it is anywhere else.
In this Response, I examine Doerfler and Moyn’s critique of Ely’s
second conjecture: that judges, by virtue of their disinterestedness, are
better positioned to protect democracy than the political branches. I
focus on this part of their argument for two reasons. First, skepticism
about courts’ capacity and willingness to protect minorities is
longstanding.20 Their critique here is less novel than their diagnosis of
14. Id. at 774.
15. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
16. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (holding the preclearance formula
of § 4 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional); Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct.
2321 (2021) (instituting a new and more stringent test for vote denials claims under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act).
17. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 795.
18. Id. at 800.
19. Id. (emphasis in original).
20. This skepticism takes many forms. For instance, one can question whether the Warren
Court, rather than on the ground political organizing, drove progressive change during the Civil
Rights movement. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE S TRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). Others have pointed to the significant
constraints the Supreme Court faces in effectuating lasting change. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008). And more still point
to the vexed relationship between rights and remedies. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
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the underlying theoretical problem, namely Ely’s first conjecture.
Second, if Doerfler and Moyn are right about Ely’s second premise being
wrong—and I think they are—then there are important consequences
for the law of democracy. A core operating assumption for election law
is the idea that judges are the one branch citizens can rely on to protect
the political process from corrosive self-dealing. Once that assumption
is gone, the institutional priorities and aspirations of the field have to
correspondingly change. This Response both explores nature and
aftermath of Doerfler and Moyn’s exorcism. Only by taking stock how
they have vanquished Ely’s ghost can we decide where those committed
to a fair and equal political process should go next in a disenchanted
world.
I proceed as follows. I first survey the extent of Doerfler and
Moyn’s victory. I show how the problem of judicial ideology in the law
of democracy runs even deeper than their insightful discussion
illustrates. It is not merely that the Supreme Court has decided cases
in ways that systematically benefit one political party. Rather it has
done so without directly overruling any important precedents or
repudiating any democratic principles. Conservative Justices have
relied on a variety of tools, each putatively neutral or ostensibly
democratic, in corroding the democratic process. I then consider the
limits of Doerfler and Moyn’s prescriptive argument for letting the
political process police itself. As I see it, the ultimate result of their
argument is indeterminacy about outcomes: we simply do not have a
good way to tell whether mass politics or a congenial Supreme Court is
more likely to produce outcomes consistent with democracy. Given that
uncertainty, the case for mass politics sounds in procedural values
rather than consequential ones.
I. JUDICIAL CRAFT & PARTISAN ADVANTAGE
In making the first step of their argument—namely that judges
are driven by ideological, rather than institutional self-interest—
Doerfler and Moyn draw on prior work by Daryl Levinson and Richard
Pildes. Levinson and Pildes have persuasively argued that the
Madisonian separation of powers relied on an inflated and antiquated

Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). And the most sophisticated recent
historical scholarship paints a far more complex picture between courts, social movements, and
the political branches than a straightforward endorsement of judicial virtue would allow. See, e.g.,
KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 19351972 (2016); LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE (2016); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
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view of institutional self-interest.21 Instead, the rise of ideologically
cohesive and distinct parties has led to a much different set of dynamics.
During unified government, the branches cooperate with little mutual
oversight or checking. When there is divided government, we get
something much closer to Madison’s vision but for a very different
reason: partisan conflict.
Doerfler and Moyn suggest that something similar is going on
with judges, including when they decide election law cases. Ely predicts
that judges “with their offices and (to some extent) authority
constitutionally guaranteed, have no direct stake in electoral outcomes
and so can determine the conditions of contestation more fairly.”22 Yet,
why is it, as Nick Stephanopoulos has observed, that the Robert Court’s
“intrusions into, and its abstentions from, the political process” have
consistently “benefit[ed] the Republican Party, whose presidents
appointed a majority of the sitting Justices”?23 The answer, Doerfler
and Moyn argue, is simple: judges are ideological just like elected
officials. That is, they “care less about accumulating power than its
being exercised toward particular ends.”24
Suppose Doerfler and Moyn are right and that judges are
basically as ideological as their more transparently political
counterparts.25 What, aside from life tenure, lets them get away with
it? A complete answer would have to be expansive, covering everything
from political apathy and the obstacles to popular mobilization to elite
resistance to meaningful Court reform.26 One important element of such
a response, however, is the plasticity of legal reasoning itself. On this
(crude) view, when a judge decides a case with ideological consequences,
they can often craft legal justifications that are ostensibly plausible and
secure victory for “their side.” In the law of democracy, where important
cases have obvious partisan stakes, the combination of judicial
creativity and the neutral and apolitical appearance of legal reasoning
is especially helpful in obscuring partisan motives and clothing
decisions with legitimacy.
21. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2338 (2006).
22. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 34.
23. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 178
(2019).
24. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 803.
25. Given the consistent partisan tilt of the past decade of election law cases and the nearly
total break from a half century of precedent, it is hard to disagree with them.
26. See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Why Progressives in Congress Should Ignore Biden’s Supreme
Court
Commission,
WASH.
POST
(May
20,
2021,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/05/20/supreme-court-commission-pointless
[https://perma.cc/6F4G-E2AK].
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Such a story could be told about the Roberts Court’s election law
decisions over the past decade. In dismantling the Voting Rights Act—
the crowning achievement of the Civil Rights movement and the most
important statute in election law—and refusing to address partisan
gerrymandering, the Roberts Court has drawn eclectically from
different doctrines and methods to achieve anti-democratic ends. This
Response focuses on four examples: federalism, statutory
interpretation, justiciability, and remedies. None of these tools—which
range from structural principles (like federalism) to methods of legal
analysis (such as statutory interpretation)—has a necessary partisan
bent or is merely ideological. But they are sufficiently protean that
judges can deploy them to restrict democracy without disavowing or
even mentioning democratic values at all. The following examples,
then, are meant to illustrate how practices internal to judging can
enable and smooth the erosion of majoritarian democracy.
A. Federalism
Begin with Shelby County v. Holder.27 The conservative majority
of the Court held Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act28 (“VRA”)
unconstitutional because it violated the “equal sovereignty” of states
and the constitutional value of federalism under the Tenth Amendment
and Article IV.29 By striking down Section 4’s preclearance formula, the
Court effectively neutered Section 5’s preclearance regime that placed
selected jurisdictions under federal supervision. According to the
majority opinion, when the Voting Rights Act was first enacted, the
sweeping federal power behind Section 4 was necessary given the
realities of Jim Crow.30 “Nearly 50 years later,” Chief Justice Roberts
continued, “things have changed dramatically.”31 These supposed
changes compelled the Court to restore the constitutional value of
federalism.
For our purposes, the historical bona fides of “equal sovereignty”
doctrine matter less than the very fact that it was available and
conceivable at all for the ideologically-minded judge.32 Shelby County is
remarkable, in light of Doerfler and Moyn’s critique of Ely, because it is
powerful evidence of how courts can undermine democracy while
27. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
28. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4, 52 U.S.C. § 10101.
29. Shelby County, 570 U.S at 535.
30. Id. at 552.
31. Id. at 547.
32. And there are good reasons to question the doctrine’s historical grounds. See Leah M.
Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2016).
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invoking democratic principles at the same time. After all, federalism
is a democratic principle, just a different one from the values of equality
and participation that animate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Framed in this way, conservative litigants and the
Roberts Court were able to plausibly frame the case as a battle between
competing democratic values. In many constitutional cases, especially
those involving competing rights claims, this sort of framing is
potentially helpful since it can improve judicial candor and lower the
political temperature by creating opportunities for compromise.33 In
Shelby County, however, the existence of competing and highly
malleable constitutional values was one among many factors that
allowed the Roberts Court to turn what had been a constitutional nonstarter—dismantling the Voting Rights Act—into a conservative
triumph.
B. Statutory Interpretation
Next, consider Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, a
case concerning a different provision of the Voting Rights Act.34 In the
wake of Shelby County and the death of preclearance, voting rights
lawyers had turned to Section 2 of the VRA to challenge restrictive
voting laws. In Brnovich, the Court considered the legal test for Section
2 vote denial claims.35 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito identified
a new and “impossible” set of guideposts for plaintiffs.36 These
guideposts included the size of the burden imposed by a challenged
voting rule, how much the voting rule departs from standard practices
in 1982 (the year Section 2 was amended), the absolute size of the
disparate impact, the opportunities afforded by a state’s voting rules as
a whole, and the strength of state interests in the voting rule. 37 In
dissent, Justice Kagan critiqued the majority’s creative statutory
interpretation, charging them with living in a “law-free zone” and
insisting that reading the statute “fairly” meant “read[ing] it broadly.”38
Insofar as Ely’s second conjecture is concerned, Brnovich is more
than a case about dueling interpretations of a statute. It is an example
of how the broad language and vaulting ambitions of voting rights
33. See JAMAL GREENE, HOW RIGHTS WENT WRONG: WHY O UR OBSESSION WITH RIGHTS IS
TEARING AMERICA APART (2021).
34. 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
35. Id. at 2331.
36. See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Latest Voting Rights Opinion is Even Worse
Than It Seems, SLATE (July 8, 2021, 10:16 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2021/07/supreme-court-sam-alito-brnovich-angry.html [https://perma.cc/J9DY-TLHF].
37. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40.
38. 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2363–64 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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legislation remains at the mercy of a powerful Court. When the Court’s
ideological composition is different, it will fashion functional tests that
empower plaintiffs when there are real harms.39 A different Court, in
particular one that might foresee the partisan benefits of a weakened
Section 2, will craft a much more stringent from the same statute.
Brnovich, when refracted through Doerfler and Moyn’s work, is a lesson
of how statutory interpretation is both the terrain for and a tool of
judicial politics.
C. Justiciability
If the Roberts Court has reminded us of one thing, however, it is
that judicial intervention is not the only way courts can score partisan
wins. Depending on the context, judicial abstention can be just as
effective. The clearest example is partisan gerrymandering. In Rucho v.
Common Cause, the Roberts Court held that partisan gerrymandering
claims were nonjusticiable under the Equal Protection Clause and the
First Amendment.40 For the Roberts Court, partisan gerrymandering
was fundamentally a political question since it required the Court to
decide what a “fair” political baseline was.41 The lack of a “judicially
manageable standard” and the supposed risks to judicial legitimacy
intervention posed required the Court to recede from the field entirely.42
Justice Kagan’s dissent, of course, challenged both claims, pointing to
the test administered by the district court and the dangers of partisan
entrenchment if the judiciary abstained.43 But for now, and for the
foreseeable future, federal courts will condone partisan gerrymanders.
Rucho represents yet another resourceful use of judicial
discretion
with
predictable
partisan
consequences.
While
gerrymandering has historically been a bipartisan exercise, recently
Republicans have reaped greater gains.44 Moreover, the legal
question—the search for a judicially manageable standard for
“fairness”—had not changed since the Court’s decision in Davis v.
Bandemer.45 In fact, it remained constant over the intervening decades
as liberal and conservative Justices jostled in prior cases over the
dangers of partisan gerrymandering, the need for judicial intervention,
39. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
40. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
41. Id. at 2501.
42. Id. at 2499–500.
43. Id. at 2509.
44. How Republicans Use Redistricting to their Advantage, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (May 4,
2021),
https://www.democracydocket.com/news/how-republicans-use-redistricting-to-theiradvantage [https://perma.cc/66MT-NZ2M].
45. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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and the relevant legal test.46 The only real shift from Bandemer to
Rucho was the consolidation of a firmly conservative Court. And the
proximate trigger was the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy and
his replacement by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. In this sense, Rucho is a
natural experiment in judicial politics. Holding the legal question and
positions fixed, only the replacement of a more liberal justice with a
more conservative one changed the law.
D. Remedies
Finally, the development of remedial doctrines in election law,
in particular the so-called “Purcell principle,”47 is a final example of a
flexible and ostensibly reasonable standard applied with a partisan
skew. The “Purcell principle” is a remedial rule that first appeared in
the Court’s shadow docket in the mid-2000s.48 It stands for the idea that
“courts should not issue orders which change election rules in the period
just before the election.”49 Taken on its own, the Purcell principle is
sensible. Elections are vital but complex affairs, require careful
administration, and depend on regularity and stability for their
legitimacy. Taken together, these factors suggest courts should be
cautious in ordering changes close to an election and risking widespread
confusion. Yet as the leadup to the 2020 election showed, federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, routinely intervened to stop changes that
would have expanded voter access during an unprecedented
pandemic.50 Moreover, the principle’s contours have “remain[ed]
remarkably opaque” despite its growing prominence. 51 Even among
legal rules, the Purcell principle remains especially flexible.
If we assume, along with Doerfler and Moyn, that judges are
ideological, it is no surprise that the Purcell principle is used for
partisan gain. A recent decision by the Supreme Court suggests as
much. In yet another shadow docket case, the Supreme Court granted
the State of Alabama a stay against a district court injunction to redraw
its congressional district lines before the “imminent 2022” elections.52
The district court had ruled for the plaintiffs after finding that
46. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
47. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
48. Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 427, 428 (2016).
49. Id.
50. Ed Kilgore, Once Again, Supreme Court Won’t Help Make It Easier to Vote During COVID,
N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 6, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/10/supreme-courtstops-judge-from-liberalizing-voting-by-mail.html [https://perma.cc/UM8M-54VL].
51. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Freeing Purcell from the Shadows, TAKE CARE (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/freeing-purcell-from-the-shadows [https://perma.cc/S2KP-9TVU].
52. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) (Thomas, J., in chambers).
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Alabama’s map diluted minority votes and violated Section 2 of the
VRA.53 In his concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the
importance of the Purcell principle. He observed that “[r]unning
elections statewide is extraordinarily complicated and difficult” and
that the “District Court’s order would require heroic efforts by those
state and local authorities in the next few weeks—and even heroic
efforts likely would not be enough to avoid chaos and confusion.”54 Given
that the Purcell principle now “reflects a bedrock tenet of election
law,”55 “even a . . . relaxed version . . . would not permit the District
Court’s late-breaking injunction.”56 Justice Kagan, once again in
dissent, countered Kavanaugh’s reasoning, pointing to the depth of the
factual record, the period of time left before the election, and relatively
short turnaround for redistricting.57
Yet Merrill represented another election law victory for a
conservative government under the Roberts Court. Like with partisan
gerrymandering, this win came through judicial inaction and again
involved the use of a discretionary tool even less developed than the
political question doctrine. In its wake, plaintiffs have virtually no
clarity about when it is “too late” to challenge a questionable electoral
map. And if Doerfler and Moyn are right, then that is entirely consistent
with the nature of our ideological judiciary. Election law cases are no
more exceptional than any other type of decision and judges with clear
partisan aims have a wide array of tools at their disposal to secure
political gains for their party.
II. BANISHING THE JUDICIARY?
So far, I have only deepened Doerfler and Moyn’s critique of
election law exceptionalism, showing how ostensibly neutral doctrinal
tools can help secure consistent partisan victories. In this Part, I turn
from extending their thesis to exploring its limits. Their arguments
have two parts: the first critical, the second prescriptive. Their critical
aim—showing that Ely’s election law exceptionalism rests on untenable
assumptions about judicial neutrality—is compelling. As I argue in this
section, however, their prescriptive argument—that we abandon
judicial review in favor of “legislative empowerment” as a “popular
53. Singleton v. Merrill, 2022 WL 265001 (N.D. Ala. 2022), sub nom Merrill v. Milligan, 142
S. Ct. 879 (Thomas, J., in chambers).
54. Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
55. Id. The strange career of the Purcell Principle has seen it emerge from the shadow docket
and, in the span of fifteen years, become a seemingly foundational part of election law.
56. Id. at 881.
57. Id. at 883 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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check on the sort of entrenchment with which Ely’s followers are
concerned”—requires some qualification.58 For it does not follow that
just because judges are equally as ideological as their counterparts in
the political branches, that we abandon judicial review wholesale for
legislation. There might be a narrow but important set of problems for
which judicial review might be comparatively better (though in an
absolute sense still suboptimal) than legislation at protecting the
political process. Instead, these exceptions highlight the potential costs
of Doerfler and Moyn’s results-oriented critique of judicial review.
Their approach, on further inspection, requires us to be issuespecific and strategic about when to empower the judiciary and when to
turn to the legislature. Their critique of Ely ultimately results
indeterminacy about outcomes: we simply do not have a good way to tell
whether mass politics or a congenial Supreme Court is more likely to
produce outcomes consistent with democracy. Given that uncertainty,
the case for mass politics sounds in procedural values rather than
consequential ones.
To begin with, consider decisions which Doerfler and Moyn
suggest “provide reason to think” that judges are worse than
legislatures in administering democracy.59 For instance, they cite
Kurzon v. Democratic National Committee,60 in which a Senator Bernie
Sanders supporter mounted a constitutional challenge against the
Democratic Party’s superdelegate system. The District Court’s prompt
dismissal of the suit and its reliance on Supreme Court precedent that
protected party control over nomination procedures,61 the authors
argue, is evidence of ideological consensus between incumbents and the
judges they help nominate. When elected and party officials are in
agreement, the authors continue, the Court routinely protects the “elite
consensus” from political challenges.62
Suppose Doerfler and Moyn are right that the Court consistently
upholds an elite consensus against popular reform movements. It’s then
worth asking what exactly the authors have proven. For the relevant
point they are trying to make is that we should trust legislatures over
courts in protecting the democratic process. Yet, the authors have only
provided evidence that courts can often be as complicit in defending
elite control of the political process as elected and party officials are.
And the positive evidence the authors provide in arguing for the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 775.
Id. at 812.
197 F. Supp. 3d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 818.
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superiority of elected officials is the fact Democratic Party “officials
ultimately relented”63 in the face of Sanders’s substantial support and
substantially reduced the power of superdelegates. In fairness to
Doerfler and Moyn, they note that this evidence is “merely suggestive”
that “political challenge[s]” are “better suited . . . to settle questions of
what democracy requires.”64 This is because elected officials are more
responsive to popular pressure than courts are.
Popular success in reducing the power of superdelegates is
perhaps Doerfler & Moyn’s strongest positive example of the
comparative superiority of the political process policing itself. Yet even
the authors acknowledge the limitations of this case. Not only is the
episode “merely suggestive,” 65 it is hard to rest a systematic argument
for the comparative superiority of elected officials on this sole example.
For one thing, procedures were in place—the primary system in
particular—that made Sanders’s popularity possible to begin with.
Without those procedures, incumbents and party elites might have
staved off insurgents. Even here, Doerfler and Moyn could respond by
pointing out that primaries themselves grew out of popular political
movements and organizing. And the authors would indeed be right, but
further argument would be necessary to show that over the long term,
the arc of the political process bends towards democracy. This is all to
say that Doerfler and Moyn’s positive case depends on both an empirical
premise—the enduring responsiveness of the political branches—and a
normative one—responsiveness as a distinctly democratic value. Both
of these premises, especially the second one, might be defensible, but
they require a sustained defense for Doerfler and Moyn’s outcome-based
approach to be successful.
The uncertain status of the authors’ strategy is most clear in
their treatment of apportionment. Importantly, their approach is
entirely critical: showing that judges are, by definition, ideological in
deciding these cases. It is here that we start to get some slippage in
their argument, both definitionally and empirically. First, ideological
shifts from meaning “partisan” to “normative.” This is an important
change since it weakens in this context their otherwise comprehensive
critique of Ely. Showing that judges are consistently voting in partisan
ways in election law cases directly undercuts election law
exceptionalism. By contrast, telling us that “asking ideological
questions necessitates receiving ideological answers” is less
remarkable. Of course, many questions of constitutional law require
63. Id. at 819.
64. Id. (emphasis in original).
65 Id.
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judges to make normative valuations and there are plenty of reasons to
be skeptical that courts should be the ones to make that decision. But
such a critique would be part and parcel of a broader assault on judicial
review. If that is the case, and given Doerfler and Moyn’s broader
project there is reason to suspect that it is, then that should be clearer.
Next, it would also mean that their charge of ideology in election
law is less novel and forceful. If they had shown that judges are
ideological in policing the judicial process because they are partisan,
then that would be a deathblow for Elyians, since it would mean that
judges actually sustain the very problems they were meant to solve.
Instead, Doerfler and Moyn’s critique of Ely in the reapportionment
cases recycles a familiar argument: Elyian process theory still cannot
escape some judicial selection of values.66 This line of attack, however,
comes with a cost because it conflates all forms of value-based judicial
decisionmaking as the same. I am less persuaded by this critique
because it does not seem especially controversial for judges to decide
that gerrymandered maps that entrench one party-rule and lock out
electoral majorities deny citizens political equality. Doerfler and Moyn
might disagree, but that would not be because they take issue with the
underlying value—majority rule as an expression of political equality.
Instead, their problem is with judges making these normative decisions
at all. Put simply, there is little that is distinctively controversial about
the values at stake in reapportionment that render them especially
inapt for adjudication. If anything, vindicating majority rule might be
one of the few places where courts could intervene with some confidence
that they are promoting democracy, however thinly defined, rather than
undermining it.
There is, however, a further and more important wrinkle with
the reapportionment example. Not only does it ground an old and crude
critique of Elyian process theory, it possibly cuts against the authors’
positive argument that the political process is better suited to remedy
its defects than ideological judges. For the problem reapportionment
poses for those seeking to remedy it through politics is that those very
channels are unavailable. And even if we agree with Doerfler and Moyn
generally that politics is the best cure for politics, it is hard to imagine
persuading the legislators in Baker v. Carr67 and Reynolds v. Sims68 to
redraw maps that would put many of them out of their jobs. Instead,
the plaintiffs turned to the courts because a liberal Court presented

66. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
67. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
68. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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their best chance at structural reform. Here, Doerfler and Moyn might
respond by pointing us away from the judiciary to the political process,
and in particular ballot initiatives, as an alternate path to reform. But
this would run straight into the issue Justice Kagan identified in her
dissent in Rucho: “Fewer than half the States offer voters an
opportunity to put initiatives to direct vote.” 69 Put simply, plaintiffs who
turned to the Roberts Court in Rucho almost certainly did not do so with
the optimism of their forbears with the Warren Court, but they did so
out of a lack of options. Rather than being proof of unwarranted faith
in judges, we can read Rucho and similar cases as acts of democratic
despair, where skeptical judges still represent the best of an otherwise
hopeless lot.
Reapportionment does not suggest restored optimism about
judicial review. If anything, it provokes some pessimism about
democracy’s ability to sustain itself given the risks of institutional path
dependence. Instead, the fact that there remain situations where the
courts (even if by a slim margin) represent the best custodians of the
political process highlights the twin risks of Moyn and Doerfler’s
outcome based strategy: it turns entirely on empirics and relies on some
undefined theory of democracy. For Doerfler and Moyn’s constructive
argument—that we should trust politics over the courts in election
law—to succeed, it simply has to be the case that the former is better
on average than the latter. And even there, as the reapportionment
process shows, institutional advantage can vary across issue space.
Similarly, Doerfler and Moyn’s argument for the primacy of
politics over courts requires an antecedent theory of democracy for it to
work. Such a theory can be as minimal as brute majoritarianism,70 but
it has to provide some criteria by which comparative institutional
assessments can be made; these standards make it possible to assess
which institution—courts or the political branches—further advances
democracy. On its own, this is not a serious problem for Doerfler and
Moyn’s argument. At no point do they suggest that they enjoy the “view
from nowhere,” without normative commitments of their own or an
implicit theory of democracy.
But the necessity of a democratic theory still suggests two
things. First, some normative granularity matters. Although it is
beyond the scope of this Response, we can identify different dimensions
of the representative process and consider the normative values we
69. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
70. Though it need not be. See, e.g., Niko Kolodny, Rule Over None I: What Justifies
Democracy?, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 195 (2014); Niko Kolodny, Rule Over None II: What Justifies
Democracy?, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 287 (2014); Daniel Viehoff, Democratic Equality and
Political Authority, 42 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 337 (2014).
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should aspire for in each realm. For instance, reapportionment is
fundamentally an issue of political aggregation, and we might think
that some fidelity to how groups actually cluster in politics should
matter. Second, the uncertain status of Doerfler and Moyn’s
constructive claim points away from an outcome-oriented approach
back to Jeremy Waldron’s procedural approach,71 a strategy the former
two squarely bracket early on in their article.72 Put simply, if we cannot
be confident that the political process will regularly correct its own
democratic deficits better than courts can, then we should defend the
former on procedural grounds. On this view—which again requires
further development—turning to politics to sustain democracy is
procedurally sounder than relying on courts, because the process itself
vindicates the values it is meant to serve. In a world where we cannot
be sure of outcomes, practicing democracy becomes an end in itself.
*
*
*
The Ghost of Ely is a serious accomplishment. The Article
exposes and dismantles core assumptions of liberal constitutional
theory. It makes election law exceptionalism a much less plausible
position. To accomplish all this within a single article is, to put it lightly,
impressive. Even where its constructive claims come up short, they
provide new directions for research. Like all great critical work, it clears
the ground of conceptual detritus for future ideas to bloom. For that we
owe Doerfler and Moyn our collective gratitude.

71 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1373
(2006).
72. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 5, at 773–74.

